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Consider the following task
[Task A]
A prenatal test determines whether an unborn child has a chromosomal anomaly. A priori,
namely, before undergoing the test, a pregnant woman has a 4% chance of having a child with
the anomaly. If a woman has a child with the anomaly, there is a 75% chance that she has a positive
test result. If she does not have a child with the anomaly, there is still a 12.5% chance that she has
a positive test result. Emma, a pregnant woman, undergoes a prenatal test. The result is positive.
What is the probability that she has a child with the anomaly?
To answer correctly, one has to integrate the prior probability that a woman has a child with the
anomaly (i.e., the prevalence rate: 4%) with information about the test’s statistical properties. On
the basis of this information and the evidence that Emma tested positive, one can produce a correct
posterior evaluation by computing the ratio:
Probability (Anomaly|Positive Test Result)= Probability (“Positive Test Result and Anomaly”)/
Probability (“Positive Test Result”).
To obtain the numerator, one has to combine the prevalence rate and the test’s sensitivity rate
(i.e., 4% × 75% = 3%). To obtain the denominator, one has to combine the complement of the
prevalence rate and the false positive rate (i.e., 96%× 12.5%= 12%), and then add it to the initially
obtained value (i.e., 3%+ 12%= 15%). Very few respondents, including health-care professionals,
produce the correct probability ratio (i.e., 3%/15% = 20%). Failures to solve tasks of this sort
lead to pessimistic conclusions about naive probabilistic reasoning (e.g., Casscells et al., 1978).
Subsequent studies, however, licensed more optimistic conclusions, showing that some versions
of these tasks led to better performances. About half of the respondents succeed when reasoning
with natural frequencies (e.g., “Three out of the 4 women who had a child with the anomaly had a
positive test result”) or numbers of chances (e.g., “In 3 out of the 4 chances of having a child with
the anomaly the test result is positive”; see, respectively, Hoffrage and Gigerenzer, 1998; Girotto
and Gonzalez, 2001). On the basis of these results, the current, common account is that posterior
probability reasoning improves in versions that allow respondents to both rely on an appropriate
representation of subsets of countable elements (e.g., observations, tokens), and to easily associate
posterior evidence with one of these subsets (Barbey and Sloman, 2007).
A generally unnoticed aspect of the results mentioned above is that they concern educated
respondents, like undergraduates and physicians, and that only about half of these respondents
benefit from the simplified versions of the tasks. Even more unnoticed is the fact that respondents
sampled from the general public do not benefit at all from these versions. Indeed, in samples of
pregnant women, many of whomhad a high school level of education or less, almost all respondents
failed to compute the correct probability ratio, even if they had to reason about natural frequencies
(Bramwell et al., 2006) or numbers of cases (Pighin et al., 2015). In other words, they failed
tasks that, in principle, should have activated the appropriate set representation. Their failure is
striking because, unlike the participants of previous studies who had to reason about hypothetical
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scenarios, these women reasoned about realistic prenatal test
results, and were personally interested in understanding them
correctly.
In sum, contrary to the common account, naive respondents
do not perform well on tasks devised to improve their
understanding of posterior probability. These tasks mimic
everyday problems, like calculating the post-test probability of
diseases. However, they are unlikely to be the best tools to
investigate whether naive respondents possess a basic intuition of
posterior probability, and whether they are able to update their
evaluations in the light of new evidence (Girotto and Gonzalez,
2007). Indeed, these tasks do not require respondents to revise
any initial judgment (Girotto and Gonzalez, 2008; Mandel, 2014).
Rather, they simply ask for only one judgment on the basis of
various pieces of evidence (e.g., the prevalence rate, the result
of the test and its statistical properties). Moreover, these verbal
tasks convey numerical information by means of symbols and
require an explicit numerical evaluation. Therefore, they can
be employed only with literate respondents who have acquired
a numerical symbolic system. Producing an explicit numerical
estimation in numbers or words, however, is not the only way
in which individuals may assess chance. Consider the following
task:
[Task B]
Respondents are presented with a box containing five red
chips (four round and one square) and three green chips (all
square). The experimenter says, “I will take one chip out of the
box without looking inside. Do you think that I will get a red or a
green chip?”
Unlike Task A, and other verbal tasks used in adult Western
literature, Task B does not convey probabilities by means of
numerical symbols, and does not require respondents to produce
an explicit numerical evaluation. Rather, it presents a set of
tokens, and asks for a qualitative judgment or choice between
two outcomes that may occur by taking one token out of
the set at random (i.e., drawing a red vs. a green chip). To
produce a suitable answer, respondents can reason extensionally,
by considering and comparing the ways in which the outcomes
may occur (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999). Accordingly, respondents
will predict the occurrence of the outcome that may be produced
in more ways (i.e., drawing a red chip). Numerate respondents
could make a precise enumeration of the chances favoring each
outcome (e.g., “There are 5 chances of drawing a red chip vs.
3 chances of drawing a green chip”). On this basis, they could
even produce an explicit and correct absolute evaluation (e.g.,
“There are 5 chances out of 8 of drawing a red chip”). Of
course, non-numerate respondents could not do so. However, the
ability to make approximate comparisons of quantities emerges
before (e.g., Barth et al., 2005) and without schooling (e.g.,
Pica et al., 2004). Therefore, even individuals who lack any
formal numerical knowledge should produce suitable predictions
in simple tasks like Task B. Indeed, both Western 5-year-olds
(e.g., Davies, 1965; Girotto and Gonzalez, 2008) and preliterate
Mayan adults (Fontanari et al., 2014) answer “red,” that is, they
choose the more likely outcome, and they do so even when they
have to consider large sets of tokens. In sum, non-numerate
individuals are able to compare the chances of two competing
outcomes, without being able to express them numerically, and
without necessarily making an explicit and precise counting of
the number of chances favoring each of them.
Notably, these individuals also revise their evaluations on the
basis of a new piece of evidence:
[Task B’]
Upon the completion of Task B, the experimenter say, “I
have taken one chip out of the box. I have it in my hand and I
feel that it is square. Do you think that I got a red or a green
chip?
To choose the more likely outcome (“green”), respondents
should focus on the subset of possibilities compatible with the
evidence (the four squares). Five-year-olds do so, updating their
initial judgments and choices suitably (Girotto and Gonzalez,
2008/Studies 1 and 2). They succeed even in tasks that imply
more complex combinations of prior and posterior information
(Bonawitz et al., 2013), or reasoning about a single, non-
repeatable event produced by an intentional agent (Girotto and
Gonzalez, 2008/Study 3). Fontanari et al. (2014) have extended
these results by presenting preliterate Mayan adults with the
same sort of tasks. Despite their lack of any sort of formal
education, these respondents performed like Western controls,
revising their initial choices in the light of new evidence. Finally,
measures of looking times suggest that even preverbal infants
form rational expectations about uncertain events by integrating
different sources of information in a coherent way (Teglas et al.,
2011). Together, these findings corroborate the view that, along
with the application of non-extensional heuristics (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), naive reasoning about probabilities often relies
on extensional procedures: respondents infer the probability of
an event from the various ways in which it could occur (Johnson-
Laird et al., 1999).
Two notes are in order about the tasks that have documented
the existence of an early understanding of prior and posterior
probability (e.g., Task B and B’). First, these tasks are not natural
frequency tasks. Indeed, they do not convey natural frequency
information and do not ask for a frequency prediction. The
following one is an example of a proper natural frequency task:
[Task C]
The experimenter says, “This box contains some chips. You do
not know their colors. You observe me drawing a chip at random
from the box, and replacing it in the box 8 times. My sample
shows 5 red and 3 green chips. I’ll draw a chip at random 8 more
times. Do you think that the new sample will show more red or
more green chips?”
Task C is apparently similar to Task B. In both cases, one
can answer by considering sets of countable elements (i.e., prior
possibilities and actual frequencies, respectively), and by making
a similar comparison (i.e., 5 red chips vs. 3 green chips, and 5
draws of a red chip vs. 3 draws of a green chip, respectively).
The two answers, however, cannot be assimilated. In Task B, one
reasons about a set of prior possibilities before making any actual
experience. In Task C, one reasons about a set of observations
gathered through a “natural sampling,” which is “the process
of encountering instances in a population sequentially. The
outcome of natural sampling is natural frequencies” (Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage, 1999, p. 425).
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Second, tasks that do not ask for an explicit numerical
evaluation, including those that imply reasoning about few
possibilities, do not guarantee correct performance neither in
children nor in adults (Nickerson, 1996; Johnson-Laird et al.,
1999). Consider, for example, Task B. Young children succeed
in it, basing their answer on prior possibilities (e.g., “You will
get a red chip because there are more red than green chips”).
However, if one transforms Task B into a frequency-like task, they
fail. In other words, if one makes a series of random draws from
the same box, and asks young children to make a prediction for
each of them, they tend to use erroneous strategies like “Predict
the color that was not predicted in the previous trial” (Brainerd,
1981; Teglas et al., 2007/Studies 3 and 4). It should be noted that
even literate adults make erroneous predictions in situations in
which they have to extract frequencies from actual observations
rather than to process numerical symbols. For example, they fail
versions of Task A in which they are presented with a series
of medical records, each representing a patient, his/her health
condition and the presence/absence of a given symptom (e.g.,
Gluck and Bower, 1988). Along with the finding that young
children can reason correctly about events before experiencing
their actual frequency, the finding that literate adults err in
experience-based reasoning tasks is difficult to explain following
the hypothesis that the human mind is “developmentally and
evolutionary prepared to handle natural frequencies” (Gigerenzer
and Hoffrage, 1999, p. 430).
In conclusion, even literate adults have difficulties in
producing correct posterior evaluations. They appear to be
unable to combine prior information and new evidence in
a normative way in tasks whose solution depends on the
combination of numerical values, including tasks that have been
devised to improve posterior probability reasoning. However,
recent studies have shown that even young children and
preliterate adults can succeed in tasks whose solution depend on
a simple comparison of possibilities. In sum, naive individuals
possess correct intuitions of prior and posterior probabilities, and
such intuitions emerge early in the course of development and
regardless of culture and education.
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